



**China's Multilateral Diplomacy:  
Strategy or Stratagem ?**

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Last fall President Hu Jintao came to New York to put the UN and multilateralism at the center of Chinese foreign policy. It was a stunning about-face. Thirty years earlier Deng Xiaoping, the first Chinese leader to speak to the General Assembly, endorsed the “Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution,” lashed out at the superpowers and called on the Third World to join China’s revolutionary struggle against colonialism, imperialism and hegemonism.

Upon assuming the China seat in 1971, the PRC cautiously began to represent China in the main UN bodies, such as the Security Council and the General Assembly. For the first ten years the diplomatic cadre learned the procedures, and made an occasional ideological statement apparently directed at a domestic audience, but their presence had little impact on the political climate or practical actions of UN institutions. (1) Gradually, as more Chinese diplomats gained experience, they appeared throughout the UN system and began to enter the UN Specialized Agencies where the Chinese had specific national interests. Today, they enjoy broad representation throughout the UN system and key positions in the secretariats of UN and its specialized agencies. In his speech to the UN World Summit, President Hu Jintao mentioned the UN no fewer than 22 times in ten minutes offering a vision for a multi-polar world and a globalized economy. Upholding multilateralism by placing the UN at the core of collective security, he recommended implementation of the UN Millennium Goals and advocated UN reform with increased UN Security Council participation by developing countries from Africa, and especially by small and medium-size countries. He said China stands for peace, development and the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. Does Hu Jintao’s UN speech indicate a fundamental change in China’s grand strategy? (2)

Before looking into the concave mirror of China’s past participation in international organizations as a way to focus on the future, I will consider a few concepts that help explain whether Chinese participation in the UN system is an application of what is often called China’s strategic culture. (3) In Chinese military writing as reflected in Sun Tzu and in ordinary English, strategy is not a single, simple concept but an interrelated set of ideas. Webster’s Dictionary puts the elements together in a simple way that parallels Chinese thought. The meaning of the word “strategy” in relation to national decision-making, statecraft, economics, and diplomacy has been derived by analogy from military practice and thought. In both East and West the roots of the words “strategy” and “stratagem” are linked and contain an element of deception. (4)(5)

### **Strategy**

1. The science or art of military command as applied to the general planning and conduct of full-scale combat operations
2. A plan of action...for attaining a goal

## Stratagem

1. A military maneuver intended to surprise or deceive
2. A deception

In 1981 the Peoples Liberation Army published a “new edition” of the military classic Sanshiliu Ji [*The Thirty-Six Stratagems*], intended to simplify the ancient Chinese text recast in terms of modern warfare and Marxist ideology. Unlike *The Book of Changes*, the 36 stratagems are all from the dark side (yin) of warfare and with no counter-balancing (yang) and belong to “treacherous plots” of the ancient military strategists. (6)

In the West we laughingly define a “diplomat” as an honest man sent abroad to lie for his country. At the UN, we have 191 “honest men” at work every day reaching higher and higher levels of the art multilateral diplomacy. After fifty years, a new generation of Chinese diplomats has emerged and I will use *The Thirty-Six Stratagems* to look for the stratagems in Deng Xiaoping and Hu Jintao’s speeches and Chinese practice in the United Nations system. In each case I will analyze the explicit PRC objectives and UN action to search for the **stratagems** hidden in plain sight of the China’s multilateral diplomacy and consider the implications for the United States?

### Stratagem: **Beat the Grass to Startle the Snake**

In April 1974 Deng attended the UN Special Session of the General Assembly on raw materials and development. Mixing Marxist-Leninist analysis and Chinese philosophy, he saw “great disorder under heaven” with the two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, “vainly seeking world hegemony.” Quoting Mao, he pointed to the “threat of a New World War,” and he saw “revolution is the main trend in the world today.” For Deng, the problem of raw materials and development was “the struggle of the developing countries to defend their state sovereignty, develop their national economy and combat imperialist, and particularly superpower, plunder and control.” He offered solidarity with the Third World, supported the Arab countries’ use of “oil as a weapon,” and called for establishing “organizations of raw material-exporting countries for a united struggle against colonialism, imperialism and hegemonism.” Not mentioning the UN Charter at all, he held out China’s Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence as the standard for Chinese participation in international relations. He concluded by saying, “we are opposed to the establishment of hegemony and spheres of influence by any country in any part of the world in violation of these principles.” (7)

In Deng’s speech there was no role for the existing system of international organizations. He mentioned the UN only twice. His was a revolutionary message placing the PRC at the vanguard of the developing countries that would use the leverage of the sovereign control of resources and raw materials against the superpowers and the developed world.

As Deng spoke, Mao was still at the helm of the Chinese ship of state, sailing along at full speed in the Cultural Revolution. Deng was keeping to himself his grand strategic plan to transform China to a market economy. A clear statement of his objectives and strategy would have landed him in a reeducation camp. Deng understood that the mandate of heaven depended on a market economy. Development was the key and China needed peace, money, resources and technology. China would do the work on its own but the West would play a key role and the UN system of international organizations would contribute.

There was applause at the end of Deng's speech, but the votes were in somebody else's pocket. Eastern Europe was under firm Soviet control and Soviet allies India, Cuba, and Yugoslavia led the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). The Chinese in the Secretariat were Nationalists.

At the time, the speech was dismissed as propaganda, but it was merely a smoke screen to cover a 180 degree course correction to reverse China's isolation and weakness. Hidden in plain sight in Deng's text was astute political analysis and a linked set of stratagems to gain China's rightful position of power in the UN system. First, the UN was a hostile forum. China would use its position on the Security Council to prevent the UN from taking measures, sanctions or enforcement action, directly against China or its fundamental interests anywhere in the world. Second, Deng sought allies with enough votes to block Western initiatives in the deliberative bodies of the UN system. The main objective was damage control to prevent Western or Soviet attacks against the PRC. Third, with opaque endorsement of a "non-aligned" program for the "new international economic and political order" the PRC joined a coalition with the majority caucus in the UN system to obtain access to UN financial and other resources in support of its economic development.

Stratagem: **Pull the Firewood From Under the Cauldron**

The meaning of this stratagem is that if you pull the fuel from under a pot it will not have the heat to cook properly. It is not a direct attack but diminishes the power of your opponent.

In the hands of the West and China's Soviet adversary, the UN Security Council constituted a direct physical and moral threat to Communist China. Not only could the Council authorize the use of force or sanctions, but also the actions had the moral authority of the United Nations. Any state that opts for a Security Council veto suffers negative consequences, placing the state up against the collective judgment of the entire world.

Many feared the PRC seat on the Council seat would bring acrimony and a new string of Cold-War-style vetoes. Just the opposite occurred. At first, China spoke little, voting with the other Permanent Members on the vast majority of resolutions. More than any other Council member, China avoided controversy by abstaining and not participating in votes. Establishing a credible deterrence with respect to Taiwan, Tibet

and other issues of direct interest to China were kept off the agenda and out of the international media limelight. Thus, the credible threat of a veto gave China the ability to prevent the use of force or actions such as sanctions against China, without risking the moral opprobrium that would come with using a veto.

While the veto neutralizes the prospect of adverse UN action against the Permanent Member, it is worth nothing as instrument of positive influence and control. Establishing a system of rewards and punishments to help allies and punish enemies, the PRC used its first two vetoes not for its own sake but for its allies Pakistan and Syria and its third and fourth to punish Haiti and Macedonia for relations with Taiwan. Recently the Chinese have let it be known that they do not support Council action with respect to Sudan, Syria, Burma and the nuclear programs of North Korea and Iran.

China has established an expectation that it will abstain, allowing a resolution to pass authorizing coercive action so long as the resolution is amended to include Chinese language arguably protecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the target state and requiring a second UN Security Council resolution explicitly authorizing the use of force after non-compliance with the first resolution. This principle of “automaticity” has been used to emasculate UNSC resolutions on Iraq, Sudan, and Syria by establishing unworkable sanctions regimes, peacekeeping operations with defective mandates and dubious legal grounds for the use of force as a last resort.

Without having to publicly condone the unlawful or immoral conduct of its UN coalition partners, the PRC collects IOU's by asserting its Principles of Peaceful Co-existence to weaken not prevent Security Council Action against its allies.(8)

#### Stratagem: **Fishing in Troubled Waters**

Beyond the use of its veto threat, the PRC began building a voting coalition of the UN's rogues' gallery. This process culminated on the occasion of the 60<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the UN, with the Chinese representative speaking on behalf of the “Like-Minded Group” at the UN Commission on Human Rights. He said, “it is time to toast” the Commission on Human Rights as “the world's foremost human rights forum,” which among other things has “woven the international legal fabric that protects our fundamental rights and freedom.” Hardly endorsing the mission of the Commission, he complained that the Commission is confronted with a “credibility problem” because it has turned into a place of “naming and shaming of developing countries” by the “use of country specific resolutions...targeting mainly developing countries.” He recommended the Commission promote dialogue instead of confrontation, and have “more soul-searching instead of finger-pointing.”(9)

### **Like Minded Group**

Algeria  
Bangladesh  
Belarus  
Bhutan  
China  
Cuba  
Egypt  
India  
Indonesia  
Iran  
Malaysia  
Myanmar  
Nepal  
Pakistan  
The Philippines  
Sri Lanka  
Sudan  
Viet Nam  
Zimbabwe

The goal of the “Like Minded Group” is to prevent the UN from considering specific cases of human rights violations in their countries. It has helped China to prevent consideration of the human and religious rights situation in China and discussion of Tibet or the Uigher ethnic minority. Beyond the human rights group in Geneva, the Chinese have established a bilateral relationship with the G-77 caucus in New York. Rather than overtly attempting to lead G-77, the PRC proclaims the “independence” of its policy while contributing \$200,000 a year to finance the G-77 apparatus. (10)

Stratagem: **Borrow a Road to Send an Expedition Against Guo**

This stratagem is based on the tactic of making a treacherous agreement with the ally of an enemy or neutral state to conduct an attack from an unexpected direction.

Among the first UN Specialized Agencies to receive the PRC’s attention were the international financial institutions. The Chinese took a gradual approach, sending a few reliable party cadres with English-language staff assistants. Today the former English-language staffers hold high-level administrative and decision-making posts in banks.

## **PRC Entry into the International Financial Institutions**

<u>Institution</u>	<u>Year of Entry</u>
International Monetary Fund (IMF)	1980
World Bank (IBRD & IDA)	1980
African Development Bank (AFDB)	1982
Asian Development Bank (ADB)	1986
Bank for International Settlements (BIS)	1999

The Chinese were stingy investors, putting little capital in and borrowing well within their means. They were scrupulous in paying their debts and projects have apparently been successful. The objective was to gain experience in the Western banking world and to obtain modest levels of support for mostly infrastructure projects. In 2000, the PRC stopped taking IDA funds which provided loans at lower rates for underdeveloped countries. Recently they joined the Bank for International Settlements to begin to exert influence in the global financial markets. As of Fiscal Year 2005 the PRC had received about \$ 20 billion in loans from the World Bank.

In the regional banks, the Chinese began in the hometown bank of the UN's largest voting bloc, the African Development Bank, where the Chinese have been exclusively a creditor. Today, their major focus is the Asian Development Bank where they have borrowed around U.S. \$15 billion for projects to build industrial capacity and infrastructure.

For the past 20 years most of China's development has occurred on the Eastern Coast relying public financing and Western business. In response, the PRC and the ADB have jointly published "The 2020 Project: Policy Support in the People's Republic of China." It is a flashy strategic plan, put together by Western consultants under the PRC's State Planning Commission, which outlines PRC development plans for Tibet and Muslim areas.

The project is chiefly a means of obtaining international support and the cover of legitimacy for the PRC's "Go West" policy which encourages Han Chinese to move into the areas of China that are populated by ethnic or religious minorities. The infrastructure projects will emphasize development in western cities, dominated by Han Chinese, and linked by family and economic ties to China. Over time, the indigenous populations will become minorities in their own areas. (11)

### **Stratagem: Crossing the Sea by Treachery**

The first major global negotiation in which the Chinese participated was the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). At the time, most of the Chinese speeches were propagandistic outbursts against the Soviet Union, the United States and

former colonial powers. Siding with the developing countries, they signed the treaty in 1982, but like the United States they did not ratify it. (12)

The existence on the deep ocean floor of potentially valuable polymetallic nodules has been known for over a century. Scientists investigating these nodules found they contained valuable metals such as nickel, manganese, copper and cobalt. Initially, because the nodules were located in very deep water, in excess of 5,000 metres, commercial mining was not considered viable. By the late 1960s, with advanced technology, it appeared that harvesting of the nodules would soon become a commercial reality. At the same time, it was feared that the economic benefits from mining would accrue only to those developed states that possess the necessary capital and technology. (13)

Sharing the developing countries' "fear," the China Ocean Mineral Resources Research and Development Association (COMRA) of the People's Republic of China filed an application as a preferred "registered pioneer investor," on 5 March 1991, five years before the PRC ratified the treaty. They have recently been awarded the rights to explore undersea minerals where they will be able to enjoy the sights and sounds off Hawaii. (14)

On 26 September 2002, Zhang Qiyue, a spokeswoman for the Chinese government, complained that the U.S. naval ship Bowditch was operating in China's 200-nautical-mile exclusive economic zone in contravention of the international law of the sea. A Pentagon spokesman said the Bowditch is a Navy ship staffed by civilians and was conducting military oceanographic surveillance within the economic zone where transit and surveillance are allowed in the American view. Last fall the Chinese research vessel Ocean 1 made its first round-the-world voyage taking a peak at the pond in our back yard. (15)

China's participation in the institutions of the UN Law of the Sea Convention means it can play both sides, placing it in an interesting position vis-à-vis the United States. By participating in the secretariat, committee work and the tribunal, China can gain the benefits of a developing country and build a political coalition. Portraying itself as the champion of the developing world, it can enforce the convention rules, favorable to itself, against most of the countries of Asia that are parties to the treaty and at the same time assert non-party, traditional international law principles against the United States which has not ratified the treaty. It will use its coalition of "developing countries" and the leverage of its foreign reserves to obtain biological, mineral, and energy resources it needs through the mechanism of the multilateral regime established to control the oceans.

Stratagem: **The Guest Plays the Host**

When the WTO was established in 1995, the PRC quickly became an observer, but the Taiwan problem remained. Asserting its status as a socialist economy and developing country, the PRC became a member of WTO on 11 December 2001. While the PRC keeps asserting it won a great victory in getting the WTO to accept its principled



“one China” policy, the WTO, in fact, has not one but four Chinas, including Hong Kong, Macau and the Separate Customs Territories of Taiwan, Penhu, Kinmen and Matsu (referred to as Chinese Taipei ).

The Sixth WTO Ministerial Conference was held in Hong Kong from 13 to 18 December 2005. The irony was hard to bear. Red Chinese cadre were hosting the worlds’ capitalist trade ministers boxed up in a “Separate Customs Territory” speaking the pidgin English of the WTO. To solve the trade imbalance this time, the barbarians are encouraging the Chinese to become addicted to ADS’s, CD’s, T-bills, and SDR’s instead of opium.

With WTO consensus decision-making, and a powerless Secretary General, China will play the long-suffering developing country, giving lip service to the greens, undeveloped, and agricultural countries, while ensuring nothing moves forward that disturbs the long list of advantages that China negotiated before entering the WTO as a former socialist “developing country.” At the same time, through a series of proposed bilateral “free trade” agreements with countries such as India and multilateral arrangements with ASEAN and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, it is clear China is working toward an Asian “bloc” subverting genuine free trade. (16)

Stratagem: **Replace the Beams and Pillars with Rotten Timbers**

Until recently, the Chinese approach to international organization has been largely ad hoc and defensive. However, PRC support for expansion of the UN Security Council, leadership in the creation the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), and participation in the process of creating a new East Asian regional organization provides insight into the fundamental nature of the kind of international organization that is designed to meet Chinese objectives. In terms of the stratagem, in each case, under the guise of “consensus” procedures and the façade of larger, more ambitious organizations, the PRC actually weakens the structural integrity of the framework of the organization by maintaining a silent veto on action of the organization.

The Chinese support UN reform including a much larger Security Council. In his speech at the 2005 World Summit, Hu Jintao favored increased representation of the developing countries, African countries in particular and small and medium countries. (17) The Chinese enthusiasm is disingenuous at best. China has explicitly rejected the Japanese and German bids paying lip service to broad expansion knowing full well the United States rejects the greatly expanded Council that would be required to accommodate a package deal acceptable to the developing countries in each of the UN regional groups. But the Chinese don’t just bluff. They would be comfortable with a large body, made up of “like minded” developing countries, reminiscent of the Council of the League of Nations.

The obvious motive of China’s assertive role in Central Asia is to obtain a secure source of energy and raw materials for the expanding Chinese economy. In 1996 the SCO began as the Shanghai Five, a consultative mechanism to resolve border issues

moving on to conclude agreements deepening military trust and reduction of military forces in border regions focusing on the three evils: terrorism, separatism and extremism. In 2001 the Republic of Uzbekistan joined and on 7 July 2002 the Charter of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization was adopted.

The accelerated formation of the SCO may have been China's response to the introduction of an American military presence in Central Asia. Nipping the problem in the bud, at a summit in Astana on 5 July 2005 the SCO declared it necessary, "that respective members of the antiterrorist coalition set a final timeline for their temporary use of the above-mentioned objects of infrastructure and stay of their military contingents on the territories of the SCO member states." That meant the U.S. On 30 July 2005, Uzbekistan formally evicted the United States, allowing 180 days to move aircraft, personnel and equipment from K-2, the Karshi-Khanabad air base. (18)

At the core of the SCO Charter is Article 16 with a "consensus" decision-making process which reveals China's conception of how international organization ought to be run. There is no place for the troublesome procedure of actually casting a vote. Drafts are circulated by the Chinese controlled secretariat. The heads of state smile for the photo. If there is an objection, a follow-up, consensus decision for expulsion may be taken, where objection is not permitted, and there is no vote.

#### Article 16

##### Decisions-Taking Procedure

The SCO bodies shall take decisions by agreement without vote and their decisions shall be considered adopted if no member State has raised objections during the vote (consensus), except for the decisions on suspension of membership or expulsion from the Organization that shall be taken by "consensus minus one vote of the member State concerned." (19)

In 1974 Deng Xiaoping advocated the establishment of cartels by developing countries to use resources as a weapon. China has no such interest today. In creating the SCO, the Chinese have taken preemptive action by creating a regional multilateral organization to cover their bilateral economic relations leading to dependence reminiscent of the "loose-rein policy" of the Ming Dynasty. At the multilateral level, in control of the secretariat, the Chinese will manage the relationships with other international organizations such as the UN, WTO, ASEAN and the EU. The organization will also serve as buffer and minimize potential inroads by non-member countries such as the United States.

At first the Chinese showed little interest in the ASEAN + 3 proposal which called for expansion of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations into a broader East Asian international organization by including China, Japan and South Korea. However, China warmed to the initiative and participated in the first East Asian Summit held in Kuala Lumpur 12-14 December 2005. The meeting is seen by some as a significant step

toward creation of an East Asian Community based on the model of the European Community. By excluding the United States, inviting Russia to attend as an observer and expanding the Summit to include India and Australia, it is well on the way to becoming a weak institutional framework to cover Chinese bilateral economic relations. As long as the East Asian regional organization is built on the consensus procedures of ASEAN, the organization will be another “loose-rein” patterned on the SCO. (20)

Stratagem: **Hide a Dagger with a Smile**

Hu Jintao’s embrace of multilateralism in calling for a Multi-Polar World and Globalized Economy merely ratified Nationalist China’s strategic decision to sign the UN Charter in 1945 accepting the universal international legal order based the great power compromise at Yalta between Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin which determined the voting rules for the Security Council. The language of balance of power and spheres of influence has been replaced with the politically correct jargon of the UN system. The PRC takes a strict constructionist view of UN Charter language citing instead the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence whenever it needs to threaten a veto to protect its interests or shield members of the “Like Minded Group” from UN meddling. The PRC is a global power not a regional hegemon and the UN system suits it just fine.

Under the banner of “the largest developing country” with a “locomotive role,”(21) the PRC has constructed Deng’s coalition of developing countries in the UN system by a partnership with Russia and ad hoc links to the Group of 77. Keeping a low profile, and remaining focused on specific Chinese political and economic interests, the PRC avoids direct entanglement in most of the political and economic squabbles that make up the UN agenda. While Hu Jintao rhetorically calls for implementation of the UN Millennium Goals, the PRC pays a miserly 2% of the UN’s budget. China asks not what China can do for the UN, but what the UN can do for China. (22)

Highly professional diplomats in delegations and in the UN Secretariat have stripped away the Communist rhetoric, concentrating instead on the business of multilateral diplomacy, votes, language, budgets, and personnel. With U.S. \$ 800 billion in walking around money (23), a veto in the Security Council, votes for votes and platitudes for platitudes, the PRC represent a political force that must be reckoned with in the UN system. They have a focused agenda and they are in business for themselves.

Thirty years ago Deng Xiaoping came to the UN with a firm belief, in the face of all objective evidence, that China had the potential to return to great power status. He was a pragmatist with a skeptical view of the efficacy of the UN as a normative order and few expectations that the UN would serve as a practical instrument of Chinese policy. Yet he also saw the UN Charter as a source of universal legal and moral authority and multilateral diplomacy as an opportunity for the PRC regime to be seen both at home and abroad in the conduct of the rituals of power that manifest the legitimacy of the mandate of heaven. With the legal power of the veto and the political power of a loose coalition of “Like Minded” and “developing countries,” the UN provides a symbolic puppet show to distract the crowd as the Chinese manage the puppets one by one in a complex web of

economic, political, military and cultural bilateral relationships designed to give the Chinese maxim leverage on a case by case basis.

### Notes

1. Nationalist China's twentieth-century participation in the UN organization can pretty much be summed up with the career of V. K. Wellington Koo. After receiving a Ph.D from Columbia, he returned to China where he began the process of negotiating the end of the "unequal treaties," and was considered a founder of the modern Chinese diplomatic service. As a delegate to the Paris peace conference of 1919, he walked out to protest the great-power deal that gave Shandong, the birthplace of Confucius, to Japan. The demonstrations which followed all over China came to be known as the May 4<sup>th</sup> Movement and this perhaps gave birth to the Chinese Communist Party. In San Francisco, he signed the UN Charter for China and later became a judge and vice president of the International Court of Justice at The Hague from 1957 to 1967. The PRC has resurrected (GU) Koo; he is presented as a proletarian diplomatic worker and hero of the revolution in a recent movie, *1919*.

[http://c250.columbia.edu/c250\\_celebrates/remarkable\\_columbians/v\\_k\\_wellington\\_koo.html](http://c250.columbia.edu/c250_celebrates/remarkable_columbians/v_k_wellington_koo.html); . Restoration of the lawful rights of the Peoples Republic of China in the United Nations UNGAOR 2758 (XXVI) 25 October 1971

<http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/26/ares26.htm> accessed 20051117; and current PRC participation is provided in CIA Fact Book,

<http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ch.html>

accessed 20051105 AfDB, APEC, APT, ARF, AsDB, ASEAN (dialogue partner), BIS, CDB, FAO, G-77, IAEA, IBRD, ICAO, ICC, ICRM, IDA, IFAD, IFC, IFRCS, IHO, ILO, IMF, IMO, Interpol, IOC, IOM (observer), ISO, ITU, LAIA (observer), MIGA, MONUC, NAM (observer), NSG, OAS (observer), ONUB, OPCW, PCA, SCO, UN, UN Security Council, UNAMSIL, UNCTAD, UNESCO, UNHCR, UNIDO, UNITAR, UNMEE, UNMIL, UNMOVIC, UNOCI, UNTSO, UPU, WCO, WHO, WIPO, WMO, WToO, WTO, ZC

2. Hu Jintao speech at the UN World Summit in New York 15 September 2005

<http://www.un.org/webcast/summit2005/statements15.html>

accessed 20051105

3. Colin S. Gray, *Comparative Strategic Culture Parameters*, Winter 1984, pp. 26-33; Alastair I. Johnson, *Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History*, Princeton University Press (1995).

4. Samuel B. Griffith, *Sun Tzu The Art of War*. Oxford University Press (1963)

5. *Webster's II New Riverside Dictionary*, Revised Edition. Houghton Mifflin (1996) p.667.

6. This year I began using the ancient Chinese game of (Weiqi) Go in my class at the Joint Military Intelligence College as a way to study strategic thinking from a Chinese

perspective. In Go all of the movements are completely in the open. Deception is key and the strategy behind the separate moves must be hidden in plain sight just as in the public multilateral diplomacy of UN. Thus inspiration for this approach came from Ma Xiaochun, *The Thirty-Six Stratagems Applied to Go*. Yutopian Enterprises (1996) with an introduction by Roy Schmidt (p. vi). In 1981, the People's Liberation Army Press published a "new edition" of the Xin Pian classic, *Sanshiliu Ji*, as updated by Lik Bingyan.

7. Deng Xiaoping April, 10, 1974 at the Special Session of the U.N. General Assembly, <http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/deng-xiaoping/1974/04/10.htm> accessed 20051105

8. Terri Zielinski, Research Fellow, Joint Military Intelligence College, "Chinese Negotiating Strategy and Tactics in the United Nations Security Council." (2004)

9. <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn> accessed 20051112 Statement by H.E. Ambassador SHA Zukang, on behalf of the Like Minded Group, at the 61st Session of the Commission on Human Rights 14 March 2005, Geneva

10. China and Group of 77(G-77), <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/gjs/gjzzyhy/2616/t15326.htm>

11. [http://www.worldbank.org.cn/English/Projects/projects\\_summary.asp](http://www.worldbank.org.cn/English/Projects/projects_summary.asp) accessed 20051125 ; <http://www.adb.org> accessed 20051202.

12. China ratified the Law of the Sea Convention on 7 June 1996 and has passed domestic legislation to implement the treaty, including Law on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone of 25 February 1992, the Declaration of the Government of the People's Republic of China on the baselines of the territorial sea on 15 May 1996 and the Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf Act of 26 June 1998. China actively participates in the International Seabed Authority, the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, and the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea where Judge Guangjian Xu has been a Member of the Tribunal since 16 May 2001;

[http://www.un.org/Depts/los/reference\\_files/chronological\\_lists\\_of\\_ratifications.htm](http://www.un.org/Depts/los/reference_files/chronological_lists_of_ratifications.htm)

accessed 20051105 and

<http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/tyfls/tyfl/2626/2628/t15474.htm>

accessed 20051105; Elizabeth Van Wie Davis, *China and the Law of the Sea Convention*. The Edwin Mellen Press, Lewiston NY 1995; Jeanette Greenfield, *China's Practice in the Law of the Sea*, Clarendon Press Oxford, UK 1992;

13; <http://www.isa.org.jm/en/default.htm> accessed 20051122 The China Ocean Mineral Resources Research and Development Association (COMRA) of the People's Republic of China. Date of registration: 5 March 1991 (LOS/PCN/117 )

14. <http://www.isa.org.jm/en/seabedarea/2005VesselTour.stm> accessed 20051117

15. <http://www.nytimes.com> accessed 20021027 China Complains About U.S. Surveillance Ship.
16. Nationalist China was one of the contracting parties of the General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1948. Anticipating controversy, Taiwan shifted to observer status in 1958. The PRC formally applied for contracting party status in 1965, but the negotiations went nowhere. The Sixth WTO Ministerial Conference  
[http://www.wto.org/english/thewto\\_e/minist\\_e/min05\\_e/min05\\_e.htm](http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min05_e/min05_e.htm)  
accessed 20051116 accessed 20051117; <http://www.wto.org> accessed 20051105;  
<http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/gjs/gjzzyhy/2616/t15330.htm>  
accessed 20051114; <http://www.nytimes.com/2005/11/25/business/25trade.html>  
accessed 20051125
17. Hu Jintao speech at the UN World Summit in New York 15 September 2005  
<http://www.un.org/webcast/summit2005/statements15.html>  
accessed 20051105
18. <http://www.sectesco.org/fazhanlizheng2.html> accessed 20051123; Declaration of Heads of Member States of Shanghai Cooperation Organization, Astana, July 05, 2005;  
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